


Advanced Placement Comparative Government
Unit IX: China
Kesselman Chapter 9



- Wednesday 3/15** Notes over China and work on Study guide in pairs.
- Thursday 3/16** China Documentary 31
- Friday 3/17** China Documentary -62
- Monday 3/20** **In Class:** Why do people vote in Semi-competitive elections?
Review **due by end of period.**
- Tuesday 3/21** Notes over Communism/Soviet and Chinese Style
- Wednesday 3/22** **Finish China Notes/Documentary. 1-27**
- Thursday 3/23** **Critical Review Due:** China's Family Planning Goes Awry. What impact and unintended consequences did this have on Chinese society? Economy?
-
- Friday 3/24** **Class Breakfast: Panera meet at 6:45 return to school by 8:05.**
- Spring Break! 3/27-3/31!!!!**
- Monday 4/3** **Vocab Jeopardy-Work in Groups of 3.**
- Tuesday 4/4** **Work on study guide in class. Due 4/6**

Wednesday 4/05 Finish Documentary. 27-54

Thursday 4/06 **Study Guide Due:** Review in class

Friday 4/07 **Test over China- 25 Multiple Choice questions + 1 Free Response Question=25 points.**

ONE MORE UNIT LEFT!!!! Iran and AP prep will start April 10 and go until May 3

1 AP Gov

2 **People's Republic of China (1949)**

Population Size: 1.3 billion

90% Han (Uyghur & Tibet are minority groups)

Unitary System of Government; Communist one party government

Hong Kong and Maco (administrative Units); Taiwan independent

What is useful about China as a case study?

3

4

5 **The Great Leap modernized the country, but ultimately failed to improve living conditions because:**

China changed too quickly; No expert advice was used; Natural disasters/peasant discontent led to famine

-30 million died

6 **The Cultural Revolution**

a. Abolish Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas

b. Get rid of intellectuals and Mao's political enemies

7

8

9

7 **Destruction of the Old Ways**

8 **Red Guards with "Little Red Book"**

"Top Down" political participation

9 **Propaganda**

10 **Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992)**

After Mao Zedong's death, China is ruled by the "Gang of Four" for a short period of time.

Deng Xiaoping replaces them as CCP leader, and dramatic changes occur in China.

11

Democracy = 5th Modernization

12 **Democracy Wall 1978-79**

This did not go well for citizens.

13 **China – Branches of Government**

One Party Rule

14

15

16 **China - Topics of Focus**

1. Political Change

-Little Change in CCP structure (- CCP recruits capitalists)

-Occasional Open Politburo Debate

-Anti corruption mechanisms

-Little Change in judicial structure

-Village Elections

2. Economic Change

-Slow (especially compared to Russia)

-Deng Xiaoping initiates privatization/market

17 **Modern China - Political Change**

Cultural Revolution Legacy

-Judicial System

(A) code law & lack of independent judiciary

(B) prosecutors win cases swiftly/harsh penalties

-death penalty/torture for political crimes

-re-education through labor

-high # of political prisoners/dissidents

-Judicial Reform

Legal training for lawyers and judges today(post college)

- Judicial Reform
 - oLegal training for lawyers and judges today(post college)
 - oPrivate Law Firms emerge in the 1980's (protect property)
 - oInternal system developed to penalize corrupt CCP

18 **Deng's Iron Fist**

During Deng's economic reforms he kept an iron fist ready to crush any threats to the nation's Communist dictatorship.

In Deng's final five years, virtually all of China's dissidents were imprisoned or exiled abroad.

19 **Modern China – One Party Rule**

- State Owned Press/TV/Entertainment industry
 - China News Daily (English version available on-line)
 - Foreign /private journalism with approval -
- Dahzhibao* – posters still common.
- Lack of Transparency (SARS)
- Censorship of Internet
 - Social Media banned (FB/Twitter)*
 - "Jasmine" censored*
 - China employs 20,000 internet censors*
- Crackdowns on Protests/Dissent
 - Tiannanmen Square*
 - Falun Gong*
 - Labor Protests – hundreds of thousands*

20 **China – results of economic change**

- Market forces = economic boom & unequal wealth
- Privatization = no guaranteed "iron rice bowl"
- Fewer working in *danwei* and unraveling of *hukou*; many migrant workers flock to cities
- "Guanxi"* capitalism
- Environmental consequences

21

Economic Reforms under Deng Xiaoping (1980s)

- 1) 1.Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
 - 2) Privatization (private companies compete against State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
 - 3) Entrepreneurs allowed to form their own businesses
 - 4) Private property rights codified in the Constitution
 - 5) Agricultural Reform
- 2) Same man who sent tanks out to squash Tiananmen Sq. protesters!!

1 **The Influence of Communism**

Which countries in the world were communist?

Which countries are currently communist?

2 **Introductory Terms**● authoritarian system –

a system of government in which power is concentrated in the hands of one political party or small group of leaders.

● Communism –

a system of government in which only one party, the communist party, governs. The party's stated ideological goals are "Marxism" (economic egalitarianism) and strives to achieve this through a command economy. The only way to advance in society is through the party (nomenklatura), and party membership is strictly limited to the elite (top 5%).

3 **Introductory Terms (part 2)**● Karl Marx-

a German philosopher who predicted that, after industrialization, countries would go through a wrenching change (the dialectic). Workers would not accept low wages and would demand a share of profits, overthrowing wealthy business owners and creating a classless society (historical materialism).

● Democratic Centralism-

Governing principle of communist systems of government. Literally means "democracy at the center" allowing debate among party elites. After policy decisions are made, no dissent is tolerated.

4 **Economic System - Comparison**● Command economy –

an economic system in which the central government plans the amount of goods to be produced (usually in a five year plan) and sets wages for workers and prices for goods. The state employs workers and controls all means of producing goods (private entrepreneurs are not allowed).

● Market economy –

an economic system in which prices of goods and means a production are decided by the principles of supply and demand. Businesses are motivated by profit incentives and businesses are free to compete within a market.

5 **COMMUNIST SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT**● Party Control –

Political party controls all aspects of political, economic and social life. This includes all leadership positions, school curriculum, all retail sales, books, press, movement, professions, child rearing and all goods are communal. The communist party provides an "iron rice bowl" (meaning government benefits) and a sense of stability.

professions, child rearing and all goods are communal. The communist party provides an "iron rice bowl" (meaning government benefits) and a sense of stability.

Cult of Personality –

In most communist systems, citizens develop an extraordinary idolization of their leader which is exhibited through large statues/monuments/photos of the leader.

Top down political participation –

Top down political participation is defined as participation which is orchestrated from the top. Political leaders require citizens to demonstrate in favor of leadership or may require citizens to vote.

6

INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN COMMUNIST STATES

Nomenklatura

7

Complete - Comparing Democratic & Authoritarian Systems (Handout)

8

Let's Compare What are the similarities? What are the differences.

1 Democracy

2 Functions of Political Parties

- Act as linkage institutions
- Pick Candidates
- Run campaigns
- Give cues to voters
- Articulate policies
- Coordinate policymaking
- Staff government
- Mobilize the public
- Act as loyal opposition

3 Authoritarian

4 Functions of Political Parties9

Let's Compare

1 Democracy

2 Forms of Political Participation

- Voting
- Protesting

1

2

- Voting
- Protesting
- Joining a party
- Joining an interest group
- Contacting a congressperson
- Writing a letter to the editor
- Running for office
- Assisting in a campaign
- Strikes/boycotts

3 Authoritarian

4 Forms of Political Participation

10

Let's Compare

1 Democracy

2 Market Economy

- Principles of supply and demand set prices for goods
- Profit motive provides incentive for production
- Is likely to result in unequal distribution of wealth
- Government regulates some aspects of the economy

3 Authoritarian

4 Command Economy

Name _____

China from the Inside – PBS
Modern China - Political Change (Village Elections and Judicial Reform)
<http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/china-from-the-inside/>

China from the inside, Episode 1
National People's Congress (Start at 30 minutes)

1. There are several debates. Describe them:
2. Ultimately decisions are made based on:
3. Congressman are drawn from:
4. How was the woman in red selected?
5. If you agree, you press what ? _____ If you disagree do what? It is all very _____.
6. The Congress voted on what?
7. How many voted in favor of this? _____
8. What happened when one woman voted no? _____

Village Election (34 minutes)

1. Tomorrow won't be a normal day. Why?
2. What is the turnout for the election?
3. Why is this election ground breaking?
4. How do the villagers see the election?
5. What is the length of term?
6. In direct village elections, there is no _____. The only choice is _____.
7. All but ___ are members of the ___ party. He is careful to acknowledge the ___ in his speech.
8. If we can elect a good official, they will _____.
9. Sometimes candidates openly _____ the voters.
10. Local party officials respond to corruption by _____.
11. The election process is making the communist party _____.

12. Voting could _____ and get a taste for _____.

Part IV: Freedom and Justice (start at 37 minutes China's Constitution)

1. What is Article 5 about?

2. What is the judge hearing a case about?

3. What does the woman think of judges?

4. What legal reforms have occurred?

5. What are problems with legal reform?

6. Judges are all what? _____ It is impossible for

7. Party officials often do what?

8. Courts rarely take on what types of cases?

9. What is most urgent?

10. Some look not to the court for justice but for what?

11. To strengthen their cases what do citizens do?

12. In 2005 what happened?

13. How many petitioners receive satisfaction?

14. China's penal system is devoted to what?

15. Economic growth can not solve our problems with what?

16. Why are policies not always correctly implemented.

(skip to 52)

What political changes can you identify in China?

What are ways that China has stayed the same politically?



Name _____

Cultural Revolution – China

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JonhSqM-tTc&feature=relmfu>

1. Who was Mao Zedong?
2. Who was Liu Shaquoi? What did he do?
3. Who was Lin Biao?
4. “Quotations from Mao Zedong” -
5. What did the “Cult of Mao” do?

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foDh1QqcRnY&feature=relmfu>

6. What did Mao do in 1966?
7. Great proletarian cultural revolution -
8. Who were the Red Guards?
9. Why did schools not open in 1966?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW6L_kRkUBU&feature=relmfu

10. What were the four O's that red guards destroyed?

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqyNMNtfjeA&feature=relmfu>

11. Who was Jiang Qing?
12. Who was Zhou Enlai?
13. What happened to Liu Shaqoi?
14. Describe factionalism.
15. How was 1967 described?

16. What did Lin Biao do for Mao?

17. What did people have to do?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8O_5s1mZEE&feature=relmfu

18. Lin Biao became what? What did he say?

19. What did Lin Biao plot? What happened to him?

20. What happened in 1972?

21. What was the result of this meeting?

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOYXzZGpwDQ&feature=relmfu>

22. What did Mao do to the party next?

23. Who are the gang of four?

24. Members of the party had to choose to follow who or who?

25. What happened after Zho Enlai's death?

Follow up: People's Republic of Capitalism (Ted Kopell)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65SMAQpsMRA>

Browse Chinese Propaganda Posters!!

<http://www.iisg.nl/landsberger/>

Chose your favorite one - sketch it below and describe it.

Why Do People Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?

Jie Chen

Old Dominion University

Yang Zhong

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

In the late 1970s, and early 1980s, one of the post-Mao electoral reforms was semicompetitive elections, including those for local people's congresses. A better understanding of voters' subjective motivation, in these elections, is critical for explaining and predicting the significant effects of the election, on sociopolitical development in rapidly changing Chinese society. Using survey data collected in Beijing, China, in 1995, we reexamine arguments and findings about voters' subjective motivations reported by Shi (1999a). Contrary to Shi's argument and findings, we find that people with stronger democratic orientation and a keener sense of internal efficacy are *less* likely to vote in these semicompetitive elections, while those who are identified with the regime and have affective attachments to the political authority are *more* likely to vote in the elections. In this article, we present the differences between our arguments and findings and Shi's. Then we draw some important political and theoretical implication from these differences.

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Deng Xiaoping amended the electoral law for the election of people's congresses – Chinese “legislatures” at various levels. Specifically the new law introduced direct election for local people's congresses.¹ According to this law, in theory voters could nominate candidates and have a choice among multiple candidates for each contested seat. Under the new law, these local elections have certainly become more competitive and transparent than those in the Mao era, but they are by no means fully competitive and democratic by any standard. These elections are still dominated and controlled by the CCP, which firmly upholds the one-party rule and allows only one official ideology (see e.g., McCormick 1996; Nathan 1985; O'Brien 1990; O'Brien 1994a; Shi 1997 and 1999a). Thus, some China scholars consider these local elections to be only “semicompetitive” (Shi 1999a).

Since the promulgation of the new electoral law, many Chinese citizens have voted in such semicompetitive elections. But why do people vote in these local elections that are considered, at best, to be semicompetitive? What subjective orientations motivate Chinese people to go to the voting booth? The answers to these questions have a lot to do with an understanding of the nature of the current electoral system in China, and hence with the prediction of significant effects of the system on sociopolitical development.

To address these critical questions, Tianjian Shi has submitted (1999a, 1118) important findings about Chinese voters' subjective motivations in semicompetitive elections. From a nationwide survey conducted between December 1990 and January 1991. Shi finds that those who support democracy and democratization, who strongly believe in their own competence to understand and influence politics (i.e., *internal efficacy*), and who want to see corrupt leaders punished tend to vote in such semicompetitive elections as those for local people's congresses. Therefore, Shi concludes

¹ Article 97 of the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China provides that “deputies to the People's congresses of counties, cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, townships, municipality townships and towns are elected directly by their constituencies” (see national People's Congress 1982).


that “people vote in semicompetitive election...not because they are identified with the regime, and not because they have affective attachments to political authority” (1999a, 1135). Instead, they vote in those elections to pursue their own interests: “to punish corrupt leaders and to pursue democratic values” (1999a, 1129).

² Our sample site, the Beijing area, consists of 8 urban or suburban districts and 10 rural counties or districts (see also Beijing Statistical Bureau 1996, 20).

But the results from our sample survey conducted in the Beijing area (*Beijing dicu*) in 1995 (see Appendix) either directly contradict or significantly differ from Shi's findings about the relationships between voting and subjective orientations, although the voter turnout rate in our survey is very similar to (slightly lower than) that in Shi's survey (see Table I). On the one hand, we find that people with stronger democratic orientation and a keener sense of internal efficacy are less likely to vote in such semicompetitive elections as those for local peoples' congresses. On the other hand, we find that those who are identified with the regime and have affective attachments to the political authority are more likely to vote in those elections.

TABLE 1
Voter Turnout Rates of the Two Samples

Category	Beijing Survey, 1995 % (N)	China Survey, 1990-1991 % (N)
Voted	58.5 (385)	61.6 (1,477)
Didn't vote	40.1 (264)	37.7 (904)
Don't remember	1.4 (9)	0.8 (18)
TOTAL	100 (658)	100.0 (2,399)



China's Family Planning Goes Awry

by Nicholas Eberstadt

CHINA'S "ONE CHILD Policy" is the mother of all social experiments in our modern era. Enforced by the power of a police state for three decades running, this astonishingly ambitious program aims to achieve nothing less than the wholesale transformation of childbearing patterns of the largest country in the world. Through locally determined birth targets, vigilant surveillance of prospective mothers, and state pressures ranging from the threat of job loss to crippling financial penalties and involuntary forced abortion, the policy has already driven China's birth rate far down—below the replacement level—in the name of accelerating the country's economic development.

By the lights of planners in Beijing, this program has been a glorious success. On the eve of the One Child Policy in 1978, China's total fertility rate (TFR) was on the order of three births per woman per lifetime; well above the replacement level of 2.1. There is some uncertainty about China's fertility levels today—not least because of the incentives to conceal

births—but there is no doubt that childbearing nationwide is now far below the replacement level, and has been for around two decades. Both the United Nations and the U.S. Census Bureau estimate China's current TFR at about 1.7 to 1.8; some put it at 1.6 or even lower. In China's largest metropolitan areas, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, women today may be averaging less than one birth per lifetime.

But social experiments always have unintended consequences. In the case of China's One Child Policy, these consequences are now becoming evident, and are no less breathtaking in scale than the dreams entertained by the coercive visionaries in Beijing who set this scheme in motion. Inexorably—and by now inescapably—a host of new and unfamiliar demographic problems have arisen, all of which will plague China's next generation.

Mr. Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., and is senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research. This essay draws upon remarks before the Tom Lantos Commission on Human Rights of the U.S. Congress last month.


These problems will compromise economic development, strain social harmony and place the traditional Chinese family structure under severe pressure; in fact, they could shake Chinese civilization to its very foundations.

The End of Labor Force Growth

CHINA'S EXPLOSIVE ECONOMIC growth between 1979 and 2008 was historically unprecedented in pace, duration, and scale. A repeat performance over the coming generation is most unlikely for one simple reason: the demographic inputs that facilitated this amazing first act are no longer available.

Over the 1980-2005 generation, China's working-age population—defined here as the 15- to 64-year-old group—grew by about 2% per annum. Yet over the coming generation, China's prospective manpower growth rate is zero. By the “medium variant” projections of the United Nations Population Division (UNPD), the 15- to 64-year-old group will be roughly 25 million persons smaller in 2035 than it is today, and by 2035 it would be dropping at a tempo of about 0.7% per year. In fact, by the U.S. Census Bureau's reckonings, China's conventionally defined manpower will peak by 2016 and will thereafter commence an accelerating decline. Though these forecasts concern events far in the future, they are more than mere conjecture; virtually everyone who will be part of China's 15- to 64-year-old-group in the year 2024 is alive today. If current childbearing trajectories continue, by the UNPD's reckoning, each new generation will be at least 20% smaller than the one before it.


These numbers alone would augur ill for the continuation of rapid economic growth in China, but the situation is even more unfavorable when one considers the shifts in the composition of China's working-age population. In modern societies, it



is the youngest cohorts of the labor force who have the best health, the highest levels of education, the most up-to-date technical skills—and thus the greatest potential to contribute to productivity. In China, however, this cohort has been shrinking for a generation, and stands to shrink still further, in both relative and absolute terms. In 1985, 15- to 29-year-olds accounted for 47% of China's working age population. Today that proportion is down to about 34% of the workforce. By Census Bureau projections, 20 years from now it will have fallen to just barely 26% of China's conventionally defined labor force.

The only reason China's working age population will not shrink more rapidly over the next few decades is because of an enormous coming wave of laborers in the 50- to 64-year-old age range. This group looks to swell by over 100 million between 2009 and 2029, growing from 22% of the working population to roughly 32%. The educational profile of this group is far more elementary than is generally appreciated: according to official Chinese census data, 47% of 50- to 64-year-olds have not completed primary schooling.

With this coming “age wave,” the structure of China's labor force will be inverted. A generation ago, there were nearly three times as many younger workers as older workers. Today there are half again as many younger workers as older ones. Two



SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIVISION, MEDIUM VARIANT PROJECTION

decades from now, the Census Bureau projects 120 older prospective workers for every 100 younger ones (at which point the situation may then stabilize, depending upon fertility trends). It's not exactly an ideal transformation in the labor force structure if one is aiming to maintain rapid rates of economic growth.

The situation might be easier for economic planners to cope with if China were still a nation with an abundance of underemployed labor. But policy makers in Beijing can no longer count on these once huge reserves. Instead, leading Chinese economists—among them Professor Cai Fang, director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences—argue that the Chinese economy has already reached a turning point where those seemingly unlimited reserves of rural labor have actually been tapped out, and any future increase in demand for labor will only be supplied by increasing wages.

The Senior Tsunami

IT IS NOT only the Chinese workforce that will be aging over the coming generation. By any yardstick, Chinese society overall will be graying at a rapid pace. This is yet another unintended consequence of the population control program, since subreplacement fertility levels necessarily re-

duce the share of young people as a fraction of overall population.

According to the UNPD's projections, China's 65-plus age group currently numbers around 110 million. Over the coming generation, this group is set to rise to 280 million—growing at a pace of almost 3.8% per annum. By 2035, nearly one in five Chinese will be 65 or older, constituting a staggering 280 million senior citizens. The aging situation is likely to be even more acute in the Chinese countryside due to the ongoing migration of younger, rural-born workers to towns and cities. According to the projections of a team of demographers led by Professor Zeng Yi of Peking University, China's rural areas are probably already grayer than its cities—and the difference will grow starker every year. Prof. Zeng's team projects that by 2035 over one in four rural residents would be 65 or older.

What are the implications of this gray population explosion? For benchmarks, we might consider Japan, which ranks as the world's most aged society. In Japan today, the 65-plus proportion of the country's total population is just over 22%. In other words, rural China will be substantially more elderly than any population known to date within a generation.

Despite three decades of dizzying economic growth, rural China remains terribly poor. Average income levels in the Chinese countryside are reportedly less than one third as high as that of Chinese cities. Japan's per capita income level today is maybe 15 or 20 times higher than in rural China. One need not be a Sino-pessimist to suggest that Chinese society will have to cope with its coming age burden on vastly lower income levels than Japan or today's graying Western societies....

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Who will care for this looming wave of retirees? Certainly it will not be the country's existing pension system. That irregular and arbitrary patchwork construct consists mainly of special arrangements for employees of certain municipalities and state enterprises, covering only a fraction of the country's workforce. Yet even these existing programs are manifestly unsound from an actuarial standpoint. Whereas the net present value of the U.S. social security system's unfunded liabilities are equivalent to America's total output for about one third of a year, the estimated liabilities of China's system are in excess of 100% of GDP. The existing social security system is doomed to collapse under its own weight.

The traditional Chinese social security system has in fact always been the family, with family members looking after their elderly in countryside and city alike. But with the collapse of Chinese fertility below replacement levels in the 1990s, the Chinese family has become a much frailer support system. In Confucian societies, the first line of support has always been the son. In the 1990s, practically every Chinese woman approaching retirement age had at least one son to turn to: in that time, all but 8% of Chinese women who were reaching the age of 60 had given birth to at least one male child. By 2025 the corresponding proportion of older women who have borne no sons will increase to about 30%, meaning that one in three elderly couples will have no sons as they head toward retirement age.

For many of these individuals, eking out sustenance in old age may amount to a begging game, whereby they beseech the families of their daughters and sons-in-law to divert resources that would otherwise be committed to the son-in-law's parents. Yet even for those who do have a son, support from one's progeny will require that the traditional ethos of filial piety holds firm; a presumption that may no longer be taken

for granted in a country whose lifestyles and mores are undergoing rapid change.

Within China today, most people have become accustomed to the notion of the country's inevitable rise in the decades ahead. However, the vulnerabilities of its aging population also cast much of China on a course of increasing peril.

The Emergence of Unmarriageable Men

IN ANY ORDINARY human population, there is a predictable regularity to the number of baby boys and girls born. Depending on the society and circumstances, that "sex ratio at birth" (SRB)—or baby boys per 100 baby girls—typically ranges between 103 and 106. Since the advent China's One Child Policy, however, these biological norms have been smashed and the country's gender balance has headed off in an eerie and utterly unfamiliar direction.

After China's 1982 census, demographers noticed something strange about the country's population count; according to the results, the nation's SRB was almost 109. As the decades passed, this reported gender imbalance only grew wider. By the 2005 "mini-census" China was reporting 119 baby boys for every 100 baby girls; for children between the ages of 1 and 4, the officially registered sex ratio was 123. In a number of provinces—with populations the size of large European states—SRBs even exceeded 130. For first births, China's reported SRB was almost normal, but for second and later births, the SRB hovered near the biologically impossible level of 150. Evidently, Chinese parents were more or less willing to let nature take its course the first time around, but were intervening to assure the sex of any successive child.

China is not the only country in the modern world to report unnatural sex ratios at birth; South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and parts of northern India are places

where SRBs have risen above 108 in recent years. In all of these settings, the strange imbalances appear to be due to a confluence of three factors: an overpowering preference for sons; low or sub-replacement fertility levels (making the gender outcome of each birth more significant); and the availability of gender determination technologies like ultrasound, which facilitates widespread sex-selective abortion. In China today, however, SRB disparities are more extreme than in any other country on earth—and there is little doubt the imbalances are largely due to the One Child Policy. Professor Zeng has suggested that the policy may be responsible for as much as 10 points in China's SRB.

Today's surplus baby boys will be tomorrow's prospective bridegrooms. Chinese culture strongly upholds the practice of marriage, but this is an arithmetic impossibility for the next generation of males. A marriage squeeze of monumental proportions is in the works for China—a society which depends highly upon family harmony to assure social stability. Calculations by Professor Zeng and his colleagues point to the magnitude of the problem. Today, roughly 5% of Chinese men in their late 30s have never married. By 2020, that fraction could exceed 15%, and may reach 25% by 2040. The situation will be more extreme in the countryside, since rural men are more likely to lose out to more affluent and educated urban suitors in the national marriage race. By these same calculations, in 2020 about 20% of China's rural men between the ages of 35 to 44 will never have taken a bride, and the proportion rises above 30% by 2040.

How will Chinese government and society function in the face of this rising tide of unmarriageable young men, an able-bodied but very likely disaffected cadre drawn disproportionately from the countryside and the urban poor? Speculating about this is almost like imagining the end

to a science fiction story—the drama takes us into a universe whose coordinates are far removed from the world we know. Even so, what may be hardest of all to imagine is that at the end of the day, this profound demographic disjuncture would leave China's economy, society and polity altogether unaffected.

Brave New Family Structures

THE MOST FAR-REACHING implications of the many demographic changes inadvertently promoted by the One Child Policy, however, may not concern those who cannot find a spouse. Instead, they may entail a revolution in family structure for those who do manage to marry and have children. With the advent of steep sub-replacement fertility rates, single-child families are increasingly common, a trend which may portend the demise of the extended family network and the rise of a peculiar new pattern: only children begotten by only children. In such families, children will have no siblings, uncles, aunts or cousins. Their only blood relatives will be ancestors and descendants.

Research by Professor Guo Zhigang of Peking University and his colleagues suggests how far China has already moved toward this new family type. By their estimates, as of the year 2011, nearly a quarter of China's urban adults between the ages of 25 and 49 will be only children. By 2020, this figure would rise to 42%, and by 2030, they would constitute the clear majority at 58%.

The emergence of what we might term the "kin-less family" is expected to pose extraordinary challenges. After all, Chinese culture is predicated on the existence of robust and extensive family bonds. Yet the inherent problems in this impending revolution are not solely metaphysical; the atrophy of the traditional Chinese family structure will also complicate the Chinese

way of doing business.

In the past, China was what Professor Francis Fukuyama of Johns Hopkins-SAIS has termed a "low-trust" society. It remains one today. To overcome this lack of confidence in laws and official institutions, Chinese entrepreneurs and economic agents have relied upon informal relationships (*guanxi*) to get things done. These informal networks have served to lower both risk and transaction costs for the parties associated with them. They have, in fact, been an integral and often unacknowledged ingredient in China's economic success over the past three decades. Yet with the advent of the "kin-less family," many rising, young economic and political actors will no longer be able to count on blood ties in their quest to conduct secure transactions.

What will become of Chinese economic performance when this key element of the country's growth formula is radically altered? One can of course imagine compensating social adaptations, such as a more reliable rule of law or deeper affinities to friends. But if history is any guide, such social adaptations are often slow and halting, and there is no guarantee that they will emerge in time to remedy the loss of social capital that is taking place before our eyes.

IN DETAILING CHINA'S looming demographic troubles, I do not mean to suggest that continued, even substantial, material progress is not in the cards for China in the decades ahead. The Chinese economy still has tremendous opportunities for further growth. At the same time, we should not underestimate the magnitude of the demographic difficulties with which China will have to contend in the years ahead. Unfortunately, those difficulties do not yet seem to have been adequately recognized, either by the international community or by Chinese leaders themselves.

There is more than a little irony in this situation for the masters of today's Chinese economic miracle. In their autocratic, but seemingly pragmatic quest to escape the poverty that burdened China in the past, they have helped conjure up demographic demons that will bedevil the country for decades to come. Deng Xiaoping is currently remembered for his steadfast opposition to Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward. But history may ultimately remember Deng—and his successors—for unleashing a population control program whose toll on the Chinese people would put the Great Leap Forward in the shade.

Name _____

China (Chapter 9) Last one!!! Woo Hoo!

Guided Reading Part I

Disclaimer: Not everything goes in order, dig! Dig! dig!

(1) How did the Communist party both (1) showcase its world power status and (2) show the world that the Communist party is still in charge?

(2) Geography

- What are the two autonomous regions in China?
- Identify natural resources.
- What is the population size? ____ What is the percent of arable land? ____
- What percentage of the population live in rural areas? ____
- What percent of the population is ethnically Han Chinese? ____
- Identify minority groups in China _____ and where they predominantly live _____

(3) Critical Junctures When was the PRC founded? _____

(4) What was the earliest form of government in China? _____

(5) What is Confucianism? _____ What is its role in supporting an autocratic state?

(6) Imperial China developed a very effective _____.

(7) Warlords, Nationalists, and Communists

- **Sun Yatsen** –
- Warlords** –
- Nationalist Party (KMT)** or Guomindang-
- Chinese Communist Party (1917)
- **Mao Zedong**
- **Long March** –
- land reform** –
- Japan's invasion of China** –

(8) **Mao Zedong**

- Describe his policies (including those towards women)

-collectivization of agriculture-

-hundred flowers movement –

-Anti Rightist Campaign-

-Great Leap Forward-

How many lives were claimed?

-Communism-

-Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping-

-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Red guards

Gang of four

(9) **Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of Chinese Communism.** To restore the damage caused by the Cultural Revolution, China's new leaders did what?

(10) Describe how Deng Xiaoping introduced market reform.

(11) What challenges did Deng face (after being named *Time's* Man of the Year).

Tiananmen Square

(12) **From Revolutionaries to Technocrats** What happened under Jiang Zemin's leadership?

(13) Hu Jintao and Zemin are both **technocrats** which means what?

(14) Describe the transition of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.

(15) Describe Hu Jintao's style.

(16) **Politics of Collective Identity** Why does China have a strong sense of collective national identity?

-What are the exceptions?

(17) **Political Economy and Development** Describe China's economic growth.

(18) **The Maoist Economy**

-When the CCP took power in '49 what were the challenges?

- China followed what model?

- **command economy** –

- Five Year Plan –

-What were initial results of the five year plan?

(19) **China goes to Market** How did Deng Xioping differ from Mao in his approach to governing?

(20) “It does not matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches the mice” – Deng Xioping

What the heck does this mean?

(21) Today, what percent of prices are set by the government? ____ Government monopolies have given way to what? ____ Today state owned enterprises (SOE) must respond to what? ____ But SOEs still employ more than ____ and dominate _____.

(22) The Chinese Communist party now _____ private businesses. In 2004 the Constitution was amended to guarantee _____. In 2007 a _____ law went into effect that assured _____.

(23) Describe the changes in the economy since market forces were introduced.

(24) **socialist market economy** –

(25) **Remaking the Chinese Countryside** What is a collective farm?

(26) Deng abolished collective farming and established a **household responsibility system** which involves what?

(27) **Town Villiage Enterprises** are now common. What are these?

(28) **Society and Economy** How have market reforms made Chinese society more open?

(29) What problems still exist?

(30) The Maoist economy was based on the concept of the **Iron Rice Bowl** which means what?

(31) How did reformers break the iron rice bowl?

(32) Economic reforms did what to the public health system?

(33) What has happened to urban unemployment ? ____ Social Services ____?

(34) Work slowdowns, strikes and large demonstrations are becoming more ____.

(35) Market reforms have opened China’s cities to what? _____

(36) China’s economic boom has created enormous opportunities for corruption. Describe. _____ . **Guanxi** (the well connected) are able to get ahead.

(37) China’s market economy has had what impact on the gap between rich and poor?

What does this mean for the Chinese communist party?

(38) How has the status of women in China changed with market reforms?

(39) What consequences are there of the market for the environment?

(40) **China in the Global Economy** (read this section and summarize what you read)

The Republic of China on Taiwan (page 366)

Describe China's policy towards Taiwan.

China's One Child Policy (page 376)

Describe China's One Child Policy

Name _____

China (Chapter 9)

Guided Reading, Part II

The Organization of the State

- (1) National Party Congress –
- (2) Central Committee –
- (3) Politburo (and standing committee) –
- (4) The operations of the politburo and standing committee are _____
- (5) General Secretary –
- (6) Retired members (aka “party elders”) –
- (7) Secretariat –
- (8) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection –
- (9) Local party organization –
- (10) President and Vice President –
- (11) Premier –
- (12) People’s Liberation Army –
- (13) The Judiciary –
- (14) How has the Judicial system been revitalized?
- (15) How does China’s criminal justice system work?
- (16) Describe capital punishment in China.
- (17) Describe subnational government.
- (18) Describe the policy making process.

Political Parties and the Party System

- (19) Describe the size of the current CCP.
- (20) How has the social composition of the CCP changed?
- (21) The CCP claims to represent what?

(22) The CCP has been active in recruiting who?

(23) **China's Noncommunist "Democratic Parties"** How many officially recognized parties are there in China? ____ Each party draws its membership from what? ____ The parties do not do what? ____ Their function is to _____

Elections

(24) Elections in the PRC are mechanisms to _____. Elections are held at the village level. Describe the village election in China.

(25) **Political Culture** How does the CCP try to keep communist ideology visible?

(26) How does the CCP control the internet?

(27) The Constitution states that there is religious freedom in China. How does the CCP control religious activity

China's Non Chinese Citizens

(28) Identify groups of non ethnic Chinese _____. Where do they live? _____ How much autonomy do they enjoy?

(29) How is China's family planning policy applied to minority groups?

(30) There has been an effort to recruit _____ to run local governments.

(31) There are about _____ muslims in China. There has been growing unrest among the _____ in _____.

Interest Groups, Social Control and Citizen Protest

(32) **Patron-client politics** is pervasive. Give an example of this.

(33) Identify some independent interest groups.

(34) **Non governmental organizations** –define/give examples of some operating in China.

Mechanisms of Social Control

(35) What is the *hukou* system?

(36) What is the *danwei* system?

Protest and the Party State

(37) Falun Gong –

(38) Labor protests –

(39) protest in the countryside –

Economic Management Social Tension, Political Legitimacy

- (40) What are the current challenges to the legitimacy of the CCP?
- (41) What factors are helping to maintain the CCPs grip on power?

Chinese Politics in Comparative Perspective

- (42) What do China's leaders believe was Gorbachev's mistake?
- (43) **totalitarian** –
- (44) How has China's system changed from totalitarianism?
- (45) China's system has evolved from totalitarianism towards what?

Hong Kong

Describe China's relationship to Hong Kong.

Tibet and China

What are China's challenges in governing Tibet?

China Jeopardy

1. authoritarian
2. Central Committee
3. capitalist roader
4. CCP
5. collective farms
6. cultural revolution
7. Confucianism
8. cult of personality
9. democracy wall
10. danwei
11. Deng Xiaoping
12. dazhibao
13. Falun Gong
14. four modernization
15. gang of four
16. great leap forward
17. guanxi
18. Han
19. Hong Kong
20. Household responsibility system
21. hundred flowers campaign
22. hukou
23. Hu Jintao
24. kuominintang
25. Long March
26. Mao Zedong
27. nationalist party
28. National Party Congress
29. one child policy
30. red guard
31. special economic zone
32. state owned enterprises
33. Tawain
34. technocrat
35. Tibet
36. Tiananmen Square
37. Uyghurs
38. Warlord

